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Countries of Central and Eastern Europe experienced a rapid increase of return to education with the advent of 
the transition. This is well-documented for most of the countries but, until now, there were no empirical studies 
of the dynamics of wage premiums in post-transition Croatia. This paper, therefore, intends to fill in that gap. 
We look at the dynamics of wage premiums in Croatia and estimate how much the return to education has 
changed between 1996 and 2004 on the basis of labor force survey data. We compare these results with similar 
ones for selected transition countries and then we look at some possible explanations of our findings. Contrary 
to most transition countries, premiums for education in Croatia began to grow only at the end of the 1990's. In a 
way, wage adjustment in Croatia has been delayed. However, by 2004, it reached the level of premiums found 
in other transition countries and advanced market economies, thus creating market incentives for investment in 
education. We also look at additional features of the wage structure, such as non-linearities in the return to 
education associated with attainment of credentials and return to experience. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Creation of an environment conducive to investment in human capital is increasingly emerging as one of 
the vital elements of labor markets policies in developed countries and of broader strategies to stimulate 
growth. Investments in human capital facilitate economic restructuring and growth and have the potential to 
alleviate the problems of poverty, unemployment and social exclusion. The need for increased investment 
in human capital is particularly important in transition economies, in which, prior to transition, the 
exceptionally low wage premiums for investment in education led to stagnation and even a decline in the 
level of human capital. Ample evidence exists on the change of the wage structures in Central and Eastern 
European countries during the transition process but, until now, there were no empirical studies of wage 
premiums for education in Croatia. This paper, therefore, intends to fill in that gap.  
 
The first section of this paper provides an overview of the labor market transformation in transition 
countries that encouraged investment in human capital. Given the lack of human capital, which is obvious 
despite the oft-cited educated labor force as one of the comparative advantages of transition countries, 
convergence in return to investment in education and in the level of human capital was needed as one of the 
foundations of the labor market transition. According to the results of diverse empirical research, such a 
tendency is indeed apparent in all Central and Eastern European transition countries, with the exception of 
the former East Germany, in which fast-paced transformation reduced the return to education acquired in 
the previous regime. Second section looks at dynamics of wage premiums in Croatia and compares Croatia 
to other transition countries of the Central and East Europe. It also offers some possible explanations for the 
observed wage premium dynamics. Third section contains a more thorough investigation into the dynamics 
of the wage structure in Croatia over the past decade. We estimate the rate of return to investment in human 
capital, as well as the return to experience. These estimates provide a basis for a more comprehensive 
assessment of the incentives for investment in human capital. A final section concludes. 
 
 
2.  Return to Investment in Human Capital in Transition Countries 
 
The structure of wages which existed in the economies of the former Eastern bloc differed considerably 
from the wage structures in Western countries. Communist countries had an exceptionally egalitarian wage 
structure, which reduced the wage premiums of educated workers. Such a rigid wage structure resulted in 
weaker incentives for investment in education
1. The result was an insufficient investment in higher 
education compared to the parallel excessive investment in secondary-level vocational training
2. Therefore, 
one crucial aspect of the labor market transition is creation of the market environment which provides the 
stimulus to the population for investment in education and, therefore, helps to bridge the education gap 
which exists in relation to advanced market economies. Without the proper financial stimulus for 
investment in education, as the human capital theory predicts, it is difficult to expect that this education gap 
can be bridged. 
 
Clark (2000) cites a series of studies that found the low rate of return to investment in education in Central 
and Eastern European countries on the eve of transition compared to the market economies. In the Czech 
Republic the private rate of return for an additional year of education in 1988 was 4% for men and 5.7% for 
women, while the rates of return in Estonia and Slovenia were also low. Rutkowski (1996) found similar 
results for Poland as well, in which the return for an additional year of education in 1987 was 5%. The 
supply of educated workers reacted to the established system of incentives in an economically meaningful 
way – the educational accomplishments of the population often stagnated or even declined. Flanagan 
(1998) elaborates that at the end of the 1980s, only 11% of the Czech labor force had at least some college 
or university education, which was typical for most communist economies. Even in those advanced 
                                                                          
1 Some authors believe that due to substantial subsidies for higher education in communist countries, motivation for education 
nonetheless existed (e.g. Katz, 1998; Orazem and Vodopivec, 1997). Even so, it should not be forgotten that in most capitalist 
countries government also subsidized the largest portion of investment in education. 
2 As elaborated below, likely there were other, ideological, reasons why secondary-level vocational training was promoted at the 
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transition countries, such as Slovenia, where educational attainment somewhat improved during the 
communist regime, it remained relatively low as by 1995 only 12% of the population in Slovenia had some 
form of higher education (Human Development Report - Slovenia, 1998). At the same time in the OECD 
countries this share was on average above 20 percent. Most of the former communist economies were at the 
lower end of the range observed in the OECD countries. Moreover, skills acquired under communism were 
excessively specialized and non-transferable from specific, outdated technologies, making much of the 
human capital obsolete with the advent of the transition (Campos and Jolliffe, 2004). One can, therefore, 
conclude that low wage premiums during communist rule caused deficiencies in higher education 
investment and redundancies in vocational education. 
 
Distorted wage structures in Central and Eastern Europe had several sources. First and foremost, equality of 
wages was one of the major objectives of political elites. Therefore, it is not surprising that wages in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe were among the most egalitarian in Europe (Flanagan, 1998). This 
fact alone explains the lower rate of return to investment in education. Furthermore, as the same author 
notes, the ideological preferences of social planners led them to put special emphasis on the industrial 
sector, especially heavy industry, which in turn led to the predominance of vocational training. Services 
were deemed "non-productive" and so accordingly intellectual work was considered less worthy than 
physical labor. This stance caused an additional bias in wages to the benefit of manual laborers. 
Consequently, planners preferred secondary schooling, especially vocational training, over higher 
education. Vocational training increased the share of proletarians in the labor force, which were considered 
to be the stronghold of the communist party. On the other hand, intellectuals were often viewed as potential 
threat to the system, so the limitation of the number of workers with broader knowledge, according to this 
view, facilitated political control. 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, transition resulted in the abolishment or, at least, a considerable reduction of 
political control over the wage structure. Orazem and Vodopivec (1997) have categorized fundamental 
forces that shaped the change of the wage structure during the transition into three groups. The first one 
was a correction of labor market distortions present during the previous regime, i.e. correction of policies 
aimed to secure egalitarian distribution of wages. The second group consists of changes in final demand for 
goods and services, which indirectly reduced the demand for manufacturing workers. The final group of 
demand factors pertains to the disequilibria which emerged during the transition process. Since education 
and entrepreneurship associated with it were not in high demand in the communist system, once the 
economic system and incentives changed, their supply was lower than demand for a prolonged period of 
time due to the inelasticity of the labor supply over the short and medium term. All these forces, both those 
correcting the existing imbalances and those creating new disequilibria, pushed the wage structure in the 
same direction, towards growing wage premiums for education. On the other hand, the obsolescence of 
skills acquired under the communism might have depressed the return to education. Therefore, the 
dynamics of return to education during the transition was not straightforward (Campos and Jolliffe, 2004). 
 
Once the transition commenced, wages and the return to investment in education, quickly responded to 
market signals and premiums grew as the first group of effects outweighed declining value of obsolete 
skills. The growth of wage premiums for educated workers brought wages closer to individual productivity 
and therefore contributed to the more efficient allocation of resources. Rutkowski (1996) finds that in 
Poland, very soon after the start of transition, return to an additional year of education reached 7.5%, 
compared to approximately 5% prior to the transition. Clark (2000) cites Vecernik, according to whom the 
same rate in the Czech Republic reached 5.3% for men and 6.7% for women in 1992, while in 1988 it was 
4% for men and 5.7% for women. Increase in return was particularly dramatic in Hungary, albeit over a 
longer period, where rate of return increased from 6.4% in 1986 to 11.3% in 1998 (Campos and Jolliffe, 
2004). The return to education, therefore, increased very quickly in Eastern Europe, caught-up with, and 
sometimes even surpassed, the rates of return to education in advanced market economies. 
 
The only exception to this rule in the empirical literature is, apparently, East Germany, in which the return 
to investment in education fell after the unification. Svejnar (1998) points to the studies by Krueger and 
Pischke (1995) and Bire et al (1994), who found a fall in return to education in East Germany. This might FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-08 
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have been the result of the rapid transition to the market economy, during which the education acquired 
under the communist regime became even more discounted compared to the education acquired in the West 
Germany than was the case prior to the transition. Low skilled workers from East Germany were more 
competitive in the unified German market than high skilled ones. 
 
The actual mechanisms that fostered the convergence of wage structures are, however, not entirely clear. 
Contrary to the goods market, where world prices were immediately available and used as benchmarks, the 
labor market had no clear yardstick for adaptation of the wage structure. Flanagan (1995) offers several 
possible sources of wage structure adjustments. One important is the influence of the foreign investors who 
could copy the wage policies from their own countries. Early transition data indeed confirmed that wage 
structures in companies under majority foreign ownership differed from the rest of the economy. Also, it 
seems that private sector growth facilitated growth of return to education. On the other hand, there were 
many factors preserving the existing wage structure and hindering the adjustment process, such as inherited 
structures of collective bargaining or wage policies in the public sector. Nonetheless, the wage outcomes 
indicate that the wage structure in transition countries, regardless of these inhibiting factors, quickly 
converged towards the structures that exist in advanced market economies. 
 
 
3.  Wage Dynamics and Wage Policies in Croatia 
 
During the transition, average real wages in Croatia fluctuated widely. Contraction of average real wages in 
Croatia during first years of the transition was the largest amongst all countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Mostly due to the war-related events, by 1993 average real wage in Croatia fell to only one third of its level in 
1989 (Figure 1). Subsequent high wage growth, starting in 1994, was also distinctively Croatian feature. In 
1995, as the war ended, average real wage grew at a rate of approximately 40%. After a period of exceptional 
wage growth, by the end of the 1990s average real wage converged towards the initial pre-transition level, 
which is more similar to other transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe. However, despite 
introduction of market forces and exceptional wage fluctuations, the structure of relative wages in Croatia was 
remarkably stable until the end of the 1990s. Since premiums for education started to grow only at the end of 
the 1990s, delayed adjustment of wage structure distinguished Croatia from other Central and East European 
transition countries. While almost all Central and Eastern European countries (except for East Germany) 
experienced an increase in wage dispersion already in early 1990s, particularly in the upper portion of the 
distribution (Rutkovski, 1996), in Croatia there was no similar dynamics. 
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It is particularly revealing to compare the evolution of wage structures according to professional 
qualifications in Croatia and Slovenia (Figure 2). This comparison is of a particular interest on several 
grounds. First, Croatia and Slovenia have similar inherited institutional structures. Second, types and 
duration of schooling (although not necessarily their quality) in both countries are very similar. That 
addresses the usual concern that differences in education systems could lead to wrong conclusions. Further 
on, the pace of privatization in Slovenia was relatively slow, compared to other transition countries, so the 
possible effects of foreign-owned companies, in particular on wage-setting patterns, were somewhat less 
important. This feature also resembles Croatia until the end of 1990s. However, there is also an important 
difference between the transition in Slovenia and Croatia. Slovenia is often referred to as country with a 
gradualist approach to transition, while Croatia implemented reforms relatively expediently after they were 
initially delayed by the war. 
 




























Source: Republic of Croatia Statistical Yearbook, various years; Orazem and Vodopivec (1997) 
Note: During the 1989-1995 period, there were no published data on the employment structure based on qualifications in legal 
persons, so interpolations were used for these years. 
 
In Croatia, wage premiums for highly educated workers stagnated and even declined until 1996, and then 
started to slowly grow after 1997. In Slovenia wage structure changed rapidly and this adjustment 
corresponded in terms of direction and intensity to changes that occurred in other transition countries. 
While in Croatia wage premiums for education during most of the transition period were relatively stable 
and started to grow only at the end of the 1990s, in Slovenia premiums grew substantially already in early 
1990s. It seems that the dispersion of wages in Slovenia was already somewhat higher at the beginning of 
transition, i.e. closer to assumed market equilibrium. Somewhat lower initial difference in wage premium 
levels between secondary school and university and college qualifications can be explained by the 
differences in composition in the last category – while in Slovenia the number of employed with the 
university degree was almost the same as the number of employed with the college degree, in Croatia there 
were 50 per cent more of those employed with the university degree than with the with college degree. If 
this is taken into the account, wage premiums for both employees with the university and the college degree 
over employees with the secondary school, were similar. 
 
While the employment decline in Croatia was fairly slow and much less intensive than the real wage 
decrease, structure of employment according to education changed rapidly. Therefore, labor market 
adjustment did not occur as much through changes in relative prices, i.e. relative wages of different 
categories of workers, as through an adjustment in quantities, i.e. employment shares. As relative demand 
for less-educated workers declined substantially, the share of employees with only elementary school and FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-08 
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vocational education was almost halved between 1988 and 2001. On the other hand, share of university and 
college-educated workers, as well as those with a general secondary education, rapidly increased. 
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Source: Republic of Croatia statistical yearbook, various years 
 
Stagnation (even a slight decline) of wage premium for education in Croatia until the end of 1990's runs 
contrary to factual evidence reported in other Central and East European countries. This difference can be 
asserted in several ways. First, it is possible that employers, due to limited organizational ability, a shortage 
of capital or some other reason, were not able to exploit all of the human capital they had at their disposal 
and paid lower wage premiums to better educated workers. However, without more detailed information it 
cannot be concluded whether the qualifications of employees matched their job requirements, or whether 
“over-qualification” reduced the rate of return to education. Even if some employees could formally appear 
as "over-qualified" for their position, their actual skills could well match their jobs due to poor quality of 
education or depreciation of human capital associated with the transition. Croatian employers might not 
want to pay premiums for education acquired in the previous system or even for education acquired during 
the transition. However, since the structure of employment changed in such a way that employment of 
unskilled workers rapidly declined while the employment level of skilled workers hardly changed, it seems 
that employers have a marked preference for skilled workers. Also, eventually, wage premiums increased, 
albeit at a later stage than in other Central and Eastern European countries. That suggests that some factors 
were impeding the growth of wage premiums for education. 
 
Wage policies in public administration and state-owned companies combined with delayed privatization 
and accompanied by the stability of wage structures in collective agreements and widespread collective 
bargaining are the most likely candidates to explain the stagnation in wage premiums for education in the 
first half of the 1990s. It is likely that factors inhibiting wage adjustments have initially been stronger in 
Croatia (in part due to the war in the first half of the nineties) than in other transition countries in which 
wage premiums increased more rapidly. War has delayed transition reforms in all markets (see Vujčić and 
Lang, 2001), so one can plausibly assume that it had delaying effects on wage adjustments as well. 
  
Coefficients used to set the, so called, "base wages" are useful indicators that could shed some light on the 
public wage policy. Table 1 shows the coefficients from general collective agreements in Slovenia and the 
coefficients set for payments of minimum compulsory contributions in Croatia, since general collective 
agreements in Croatia do not stipulate base wage ratios. Although coefficients for minimum compulsory 
contributions in Croatia are not binding, they are effectively used as guidelines for employers when setting 
the minimum wages for groups of workers with the same degree of education. What can we infer from the FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-08 
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Table 1? First, range of Slovenian coefficients is somewhat wider. Second, Croatian coefficients first grow 
faster (for low-skilled workers) and than (for high-skilled workers) slower than Slovenian coefficients 
making the Croatian coefficients distribution flatter. Therefore, wage premiums for workers with medium 
levels of education (such as secondary school) over unskilled workers are somewhat higher in Croatia, but 
wage premiums for highly skilled workers (such as those with a university degree) over those with medium 
levels of education are considerably lower in Croatia. 
 
Table 1: Coefficients from general collective agreements (Slovenia)  







Unskilled 1.00  1.00 
Semi-skilled and elementary school qualifications  1.10  1.20 
Skilled 1.23  1.40 
Secondary school qualifications  1.37  1.60 
Highly-skilled 1.55  1.85 
College education  1.85  2.10 
University education  2.10  2.20 
University education – master  2.50  2.60 
University education – Ph.D.  3.00  2.80 
    
Secondary school/(semi-skilled and elem. sch.) premium  1.25  1.33 
University education/Secondary school premium  1.53  1.38 
Source: Haltiwanger and Vodopivec, 2003; Narodne novine, no. 77/2000.  
(Decision on bases, rates, and methods for computation and payment of funds  
to exercise the rights from compulsory health insurance) 
 
Shown indicators of government wage policy are of an indicative nature only, while estimating the impact 
of wage policies on evolution of wage premiums would require a more detailed inspection of wage 
premiums, preferably at the level of individual economic activities, and correlating those with such factors 
as the structure of ownership, level of unionization and the prevalence of wage bargaining. This paper does 
not aim to do that, but rather seeks to explore in detail change in the wage premiums during the late 




4.  Return to Human Capital in Croatia 
 
This section contains a more thorough investigation into the dynamics of the wage structure in Croatia over 
the past decade. First, we estimate the rate of return to investment in human capital from the first Labor 
Force Survey in Croatia, and then we repeat the exercise to find out what has changed in the post-war 
period. 
 
We use the Labor Force Survey (LFS) as a database. Although in many ways imperfect, LFS is the most 
extensive data source on the characteristics of the Croatian labor market participants. The list of advantages 
related to the use of the LFS database would include a fair quantity of demographic data on labor market 
participants and their households, detailed information on their current jobs as well as some job history. 
LFS questionnaire grew until it contained almost a hundred questions related to characteristics of the labor 
market participants in 2004, in addition to some background sampling information. There is no other source 
of data in Croatia, survey or administrative, with such a detailed information on labor market participants. 
Further on, it is performed on a regular basis, making it possible to monitor changes in the labor market on 
a consistent basis. Finally, in countries where there is a sizeable informal activity, such as in Croatia, LFS is 
typically a more comprehensive source of data than the administrative ones. 
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However, there are also some shortcomings of using the LFS for purpose of this study. Since the first LFS 
was conducted in Croatia in November 1996, it is not possible to investigate earlier periods (that is, early 
transition) based on this source of data. Regular semi-annual surveys commenced since the beginning of 
1998. Also, the structure of the database has changed as it evolved over time, so that some of the variables 
may not be available for earlier periods or may not be directly comparable between earlier and later 
surveys. As shown in the previous chapter, aggregated administrative data on wage premiums exhibit very 
little dynamics until the mid-1990s. Therefore, although this indicator does not control for personal 
characteristics of employees, it can be reasonably assumed, without running into a great risk of making an 
error, that wage premiums to education indeed did not grow in the early period of transition in Croatia. 
Further on, participants in the LFS are rotated regularly, making it impossible to monitor transitions an 
individual makes between different jobs and labor market states through time. Finally, non-response and 
refusal to participate in the LFS are not irrelevant
3 and these may bias the results to some extent. 
 
The rate of return to investment in human capital in Croatia is computed on the basis of surveys conducted 
in November 1996 and in 2004
4. In November 1996, 7,451 households participated in the survey, 
encompassing 19,547 persons, while the survey conducted in the first half of 2002 included 8,095 
households with a total of 22,592 persons who agreed to participate. The sampling for the survey is a dual-
stage stratified random sampling, and the stratification was broken down by county. The primary sampling 
units are segments that consist of one or more census districts formed for the needs of the Population 
Census, and it was from these segments that the final secondary units, inhabited homes, were chosen 
(National Statistics Bureau, 2003). 
 
The regression variables were chosen according to the basic Mincerian earnings function specification (see, 
for example, De la Fuente and Ciccone, 2002 or Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2001) which describes the 
wage structure. All those variables were constructed on the basis of responses to the survey questions. 
These variables include hourly wage (in logarithm), derived from the usual monthly salary and the number 
of usually worked hours, and years of schooling, directly transposed from the answers to the relevant 
questions in the LFS. Moreover, the LFS contains data on the highest educational degree attained, so that 
the years of schooling were supplemented with binary variables for the achievement of selected degrees. 
These variables should capture possible non-linearity in the return to education associated with the 
"sheepskin" effects, or return to degrees rather than education. The credentialist view, according to which 
the completed level of education generates most of the additional return to education rather than simply an 
additional year of education, was tested in this way (for detailed elaboration of the credentialist view see 
Ferrer and Riddell, 2002)
5. Further on, both the experience and tenure variables were introduced into the 
regression in order to check whether it is the total experience or the tenure with the single employer that 
makes more difference to the earnings. Because of the usual problems with the definition and properties of 
the experience and tenure data in the empirical literature, those two variables, as drawn from the LFS 
database, were checked for consistency against each other and also against the potential experience derived 
from the age and acquired schooling. No substantial inconsistencies were found. Finally, a set of dummy 
variables was introduced in order to control for wage differences arising from job attributes (such as 
region
6,economic activity and ownership status of the enterprise) as well as from remaining personal 
characteristics (marital status). 
                                                                          
3 The overall non-response rate for the 1st half of 2004 was 15.0% and the refusal rate was 7.9%. The overall non-response rate 
increased somewhat to 15.8% in in the 2nd half-year of 2004, while the refusal rate declined to 5.1%. Non-response rate in first 
survey conducted in 1996 was 6.3%, which is considerably lower than non-response rates in recent surveys (but might also be 
attributable to methodological differences), while refusal rate was not published at that time. 
4 Databases of two semi-annual surveys performed in 2004 were merged. This also doubled the sample size. 
5 The available options for the highest attained educational level include (i) no school; (ii) 1-3 years of elementary school; (iii) 4-7 
years of elementary school; (iv) elementary school; (v) school for craft and industrial occupations, school for skilled manual 
workers; (vi) technical, economic, health and other secondary schools; (vii) grammar school; (viii) non-university college; (ix) 
university or academy; (x) masters of arts or sciences and (xi) doctorate. Some of those options  were grouped according to the 
following principle: 1) elementary school (group iv), 2) secondary school (groups v, vi and vii), 3) non-university college (group 
viii) and 4) university and more. The options in 1996 LFS were defined in a bit different manner, but allow for the same type of 
aggregation. 
6 Regions were formed according to the last available Eurostat's NUTS-2 level statistical breakdown available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts/codelist_en.cfm?list=cec. According to this breakdown, at the moment there are four FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-08 
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All of the persons from the LFS database who met international criteria for employment
7 were included in 
the initial sample. Out of those, persons who did not respond to one or more of the questions needed for the 
construction of the variables as well as those who did not declare any income (such as unpaid family 
workers) were excluded from the sample. In the end, the sample for 1996 contained 5,189 observations (out 
of 7,793 initial observations), while the sample for 2004 contained 10,097 persons (out of 11,221 initial 
observations). While most of the exclusions from the 2004 dataset were based on the omission of unpaid 
family workers, in the first survey numerous exclusions were also due to the poor data availability, which 
should be taken into the account when interpreting the results. 
 
The regression estimates are presented in the appendix. The results (Table 1 in the appendix) confirm our 
earlier assertion that between 1996 and 2004, in the second stage of transition in Croatia, the return to 
investment in education did in fact substantially increase. While in 1996 the rate of return to additional year 
of education stood at approximately 5% for both men and women, in 2004 it grew close to 1.5 percentage 
points (or about a quarter of the previous rate of return) for men and almost as much as 3 percentage points 
(or more than half of the previous rate of return) for women. This means that, in 2004, the rate of return to 
investment in education in Croatia was a little higher than the average in Europe
8, while the increasing 
tendency pattern of the return to education was similar to the dynamics observed in other transition 
countries (see Table 2 below). It is interesting to note that, already in the early 1990’s, return to education 
in Slovenia was somewhat higher than it was in Croatia in 1996. This is compatible with previously 
presented administrative evidence on more dispersed wages in the mid-1990s, despite the fact that Slovenia 
was more developed country with higher level of human capital and usually considered to be an example of 
slow reformer. 
 
Table 2: Selected evidence on increasing returns to an additional year of education in transition countries 
Pre-transition During  the  transition  Authors (source)  Country
Year M  F All Year  M F All 
Chase (1998)  Czech R.  1984  2.4  4.2   1993  5.2  5.8   
 Slovakia  1984  2.8  4.4   1993  4.9  5.4   
Clark (2000) (according to Vecernik)  Czech R.  1988 4.0 5.7   1992 5.3  6.7  
Rutkowski (1996)  Poland  1987      5.0 1993      7.5 
Campos and Jolliffe (2004)  Hungary  1986      6.4 1998      11.3















Sheidvasser and Benitez-Silva (1999)  Russia          1992-99  3.2  4.9  4.0 
 
The determination coefficient in basic equations for both of the observed periods (1996 and 2004) is not 
particularly high (0.18 in 1996 and 0.32 in 2004), which is common for earnings regressions. Even 
inclusion of the sectoral dummies that should account for different pace of restructuring between industries 
did not improve the goodness of fit significantly. Increase of the determination coefficient over time is not 
the usual finding since transition reforms tend to make the determination coefficient of earnings equations 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
regions in Croatia (it is expected that new breakdown will be defined on the course of the negotiation process between Croatia and 
the EU): Central Croatia (comprising of Krapinsko-zagorska, Varaždinska, Međimurska, Koprivničko-križevačka, Bjelovarsko-
bilogorska, Sisačko-moslavačka and Karlovačka counties), Adriatic Croatia (comprising of Istarska, Primorsko-goranska, Ličko-
senjska, Zadarska, Šibensko-kninska, Splitsko-dalmatinska and Dubrovačko-neretvanska counties), Eastern Croatia (comprising of 
Virovitičko-podravska, Osječko-baranjska, Vukovarsko-srijemska, Brodsko-posavska and Požeško-slavonska counties) and the 
Zagreb region (comprising of the city of Zagreb and the Zagreb county). Croatia submitted a new proposal to form two NUTS-2 
regions only, but an agreement with the European Commission and the Eurostat was not yet reached at a time this article was 
written. 
7 One hour or more, in the relevant week, spent at work on the job that provides the means for living. 
8 Denny, Harmon, and Lydon (2000), who estimate the Mincerian return to schooling using homogenized data for different 
European countries, find an average Mincerian return to schooling of around 6.5 percent in Europe. Harmon, Walker and 
Westergaard-Nielsen (2001) report similar results in their review of literature. However, most studies (including Denny, Harmon, 
and Lydon 2000) use gross (i.e. before tax) wages, while our data allow us to use net wage only. Given that most tax systems are 
progressive, but with the degree of progresivity varying among countries, cross-national comparisons have to be interpreted with 
care, especially if estimates based on gross wages are mixed with estimates based on net wages.
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lower due to the increasing complexity of the production structure and less control over the wage setting 
process. The fact that in our case it increases could simply reflect the fact that for 2004 we operated with 
more reliable data because the LFS became better established over the years. However, it is also possible 
that in 2004 the same independent variables indeed better explained the structure of earnings than in 1996. 
New wage structures might have started to emerge in 1996, after the end of the conflict, and deep nto the 
transition process, overlaping with the old ones. Overlap of the "old" wage structure with the emergence of 
different new wage patterns might have resulted in more dispersed earnings distribution. 
 
Result of both basic and augmented regressions show that the impact of experience and tenure on wages is 
insignificant for the earlier observed period, while it appears significant, albeit rather low, for the later 
period. Such results for the earlier period may be the result of poor data, since the quality of the indicator 
depends on the memory of the respondent. Much more likely, they demonstrate relative unimportance of 
these two factors during the mid-1990's, when the transition process made previously acquired experience 
obsolete. Although the evidence on return to experience is not clear-cut, pattern of decreasing returns to 
experience during the transition is well documented for some countries (for Slovenia see Orazem and 
Vodopivec, 1997). Flattening of the earnings profiles may also result from rising returns to experience of 
younger cohorts. Even in the later period, when the patterns of the return to experience in Croatia 
stabilized, the return to an additional year of experience remained low as males with thirty years of 
experience earned only about 18% more than those without any experience, based on the specifications that 
do not include tenure. Return to experience for females was even lower, although it was less curved, due to 
the prevalence of tenure effects, so females with a long experience (thirty years or more) earned higher 
premium than males. If the effect of the experience is separated from the tenure, then it appears even less 
important. 
 
Augmentation of basic equations with dummy variables denoting highest educational attainments, which 
describe the marginal effect on wage from acquisition of a certain degree, does not substantially improve 
their overall fit. However, most of these variables appear to be significantly different from zero. Also, their 
inclusion in the initial period reduces rate of return associated with an additional year of education by about 
a quarter for males and by about a third for females, indicating that a significant portion of return to 
education in Croatia results from credentials. Moreover, it seems that the importance of credentials even 
increased during the transition. Additional return associated with credentials explains most of the increase 
in return to education for men, accounting for about half the return to education in 2004, while the relative 
importance of credentials for females remained about the same. It is also interesting to observe the marginal 
effects arising from attainment of a certain degree on the wage premium. Clearly, non-university college 
and university degree are associated with largest additional returns, both for males and females. While 
these premiums increased during the observed period, the premium associated with masters or higher 
degree was somewhat reduced. The structure of premiums for females changed very slightly, the only 
important change being the increase of premium for masters and higher degrees
9.  
 
                                                                          
9 There are very few persons with masters or higher degree in the sample so it is not strange to find that the results are not 
significant. It is similar to the small number of persons without education, which are used as a benchmark in the regressions. FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-08 
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Men 1996 Men 2004
Women 1996 Women 2004
 
 
The structure of wage premiums according to economic activities remained fairly stable during the 
observed period. Sectors with the highest wage premiums (over the manufacturing, which served as a 
benchmark) include financial intermediation, public administration, mining, utilities and health. Wage 
premium in public administration was somewhat reduced over the observed period, while in health sector it 
grew healthy. Industry dummies have to be interpreted with some caution as they interact with the state 
sector dummy. State employees comprise most of the employees in certain sectors, such as public 
administration and health, while in other activities state is less present. While results for 1996 indicate that 
state sector employment was on average associated with somewhat lower wages, this effect disappeared by 
2004 and even turned into a wage advantage of the state sector employees. This was accompanied by a 
change in the relative share of state sector employees. As privatization advanced, and new jobs were 
created in the private sector, the portion of state sector employees shrank from over a half in 1996 to 38% 
in 2004.  
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The last set of variables describes geographical differences. Wages in East and Central Croatia were 
significantly lower than wages in the Zagreb region and the Adriatic Croatia. The wage gap between those 
regions has even widened over the observed period. Living in urban settlement does seem to be related with 
higher wages, although the premium is not so high. Finally, marriage appears to be associated with 
somewhat higher wages for men only, which is consistent with the findings in the literature. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Transition countries experienced a rapid convergence of wage premiums from egalitarian towards more 
dispersed wage structures that exist in developed market economies. This increase in premiums for 
education started in the early transition and persisted. Until now there were no empirical studies of wage 
premiums to education in Croatia. This paper fills in that gap. We look at the dynamics of wage premiums 
in Croatia and compute return to investment in education for 1996 (first year for which we had LFS data) 
and 2004. We compare results with selected transition countries and look at some possible explanations of 
the findings.  
 
Contrary to most of the transition countries, premiums for education in Croatia began to grow only by the 
end of the 1990s. In a way, wage adjustment in Croatia has been delayed. We offer some possible 
explanations for that. Most plausible one, of course, is that the war delayed transition in labor market, as FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-08 
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well as in other markets. By 2004, however, the return to education reached the same (and even slightly 
higher than average) level as in other transition countries and advanced market economies, thus creating 
clear market incentives for investment in education.  
 
We also look at the impact of credentials, as well as additional features of the wage structure, such as 
tenure, economic sector of employment and regional affiliation. We find that a large portion on the return 
to education can be explained by nonlinearities associated with certain degrees and most of the additional 
return to education, especially for men, came through higher return to credentials. Return to education also 
increased due to higher probability of being in employment for educated persons, but we leave more formal 
investigation of this effect for future research. Experience and tenure do not appear to be important 
determinants for earnings, which may have to do with irrelevance of experience acquired under the 
previous regime. Also, we find that wage advantage associated with working in certain economic activities 
remained fairly stable, especially for men. Wage advantage associated with working in public sector 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Averages Males Females All Males Females All
Net wage per hour (HRK) 21.3 19.3 20.4 11.7 10.4 11.1
Years of education 11.6 12.0 11.7 11.5 12.0 11.7
Tenure 11.0 11.5 11.2 11.1 10.0 10.6
Experience 18.2 17.2 17.8 16.6 13.8 15.4
Proportion of the sample
Education
No school 2.1 1.5 1.9 4.5 2.8 3.7
Elementary school 13.8 14.5 14.1 15.8 14.9 15.4
Secondary school 67.6 59.7 64.3 61.0 57.8 59.6
Non-university college 6.2 9.6 7.6 5.8 9.6 7.5
University 9.2 14.1 11.3 9.8 11.7 10.7
Masters and PhD 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.5
Personal characteristics
Married 69.0 68.8 68.9 74.1 70.3 72.4
Urban population 51.6 62.9 56.4 64.5 74.4 68.9
State sector employees 34.6 43.3 38.3 50.6 56.7 53.3
Economic activities
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  7.8 4.4 6.4 6.7 2.8 5.0
Fishing 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2
Mining and quarrying 1.1 0.1 0.6 1.0 0.1 0.6
Manufacturing 24.7 18.4 22.1 27.1 22.6 25.1
Electricity, gas and water supply  3.1 1.2 2.3 3.7 0.9 2.4
Construction 14.4 1.6 9.0 12.1 1.5 7.4
Wholesale and retail trade 12.6 18.9 15.3 12.8 18.7 15.5
Hotels and restaurants  4.7 7.1 5.7 4.1 5.7 4.8
Transport, storage and communication  10.3 3.5 7.4 11.4 4.1 8.1
Financial intermediation  1.1 3.4 2.1 1.2 4.8 2.8
Real estate, renting and business activities 4.2 4.2 4.2 3.2 4.3 3.7
Public administration 7.3 7.9 7.5 6.4 7.2 6.7
Education 3.0 12.3 6.9 3.1 10.7 6.5
Health and social work  2.3 11.8 6.3 3.2 12.2 7.2
Other community and social activities  3.0 4.9 3.8 3.5 3.8 3.6
Regions
Zagreb region 22.2 28.3 24.8 25.3 29.3 27.1
Central Croatia 25.5 22.1 24.1 27.3 25.3 26.4
Adriatic Croatia 31.4 32.1 31.7 30.5 30.7 30.6
East Croatia 20.9 17.5 19.5 16.9 14.7 15.9
2004 1996
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Table 2: Regression results (standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable Males Females Males Females Males Females
Constant 1.7069 *** 1.6066 *** 1.8452 *** 1.8624 *** 1.8452 *** 1.8622 ***
(0.0413) (0.0404) (0.0578) (0.0601) (0.0577) (0.0601)
Years of education 0.0494 *** 0.0513 *** 0.0373 *** 0.0336 *** 0.0372 *** 0.0334 ***
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0072) (0.0078)
Elementary school 0.0139 -0.0943 * 0.0136 -0.0924 *
(0.0428) (0.0538) (0.0428) (0.0535)
Secondary school -0.0348 0.0249 -0.0343 0.0257
(0.0342) (0.0359) (0.0342) (0.0358)
Non-university college 0.0991 *** 0.1177 *** 0.0991 *** 0.1183 ***
(0.0327) (0.0295) (0.0327) (0.0294)
University 0.0867 ** 0.0887 *** 0.0871 ** 0.0893 ***
(0.0380) (0.0334) (0.0380) (0.0333)
Masters and higher 0.1659 ** -0.0320 0.1651 ** -0.0322
(0.0764) (0.0683) (0.0763) (0.0683)
Tenure -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0002
(0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0037)
Tenure^2 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Experience 0.0032 0.0020 0.0035 0.0017 0.0022 0.0016
(0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0023)
Experience^2 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Marital status 0.0734 *** -0.0159 0.0667 *** -0.0147 0.0669 *** -0.0147
(0.0179) (0.0160) (0.0178) (0.0159) (0.0178) (0.0159)
State sector -0.0591 *** -0.0299 -0.0604 *** -0.0368 ** -0.0610 *** -0.0380 **
(0.0174) (0.0186) (0.0173) (0.0184) (0.0167) (0.0179)
Urban settlement 0.0210 0.0682 *** 0.0205 0.0646 *** 0.0204 0.0648 ***
(0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0167) (0.0173) (0.0167) (0.0173)
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  0.0260 0.0263 -0.0062 -0.0045 -0.0055 -0.0042
(0.0325) (0.0458) (0.0326) (0.0456) (0.0325) (0.0455)
Fishing 0.0947 -0.3762 0.0835 -0.3439 0.0832 -0.3409
(0.1282) (0.2350) (0.1274) (0.2324) (0.1274) (0.2321)
Mining and quarrying 0.1377 * 0.0109 0.1352 * -0.0445 0.1347 * -0.0470
(0.0713) (0.2347) (0.0707) (0.2322) (0.0707) (0.2320)
Electricity, gas and water supply  0.1170 *** 0.1327 * 0.1303 *** 0.1306 * 0.1303 *** 0.1310 *
(0.0404) (0.0746) (0.0402) (0.0737) (0.0401) (0.0737)
Construction 0.0499 ** 0.1145 ** 0.0491 ** 0.1049 * 0.0500 ** 0.1052 *
(0.0250) (0.0580) (0.0248) (0.0574) (0.0246) (0.0574)
Wholesale and retail trade -0.0366 -0.0710 *** -0.0325 -0.0594 *** -0.0321 -0.0589 ***
(0.0247) (0.0224) (0.0245) (0.0225) (0.0244) (0.0223)
Hotels and restaurants  -0.1262 *** -0.0192 -0.1129 *** -0.0112 -0.1129 *** -0.0108
(0.0380) (0.0332) (0.0377) (0.0328) (0.0377) (0.0327)
Transport, storage and communication  0.1023 *** 0.0629 * 0.1049 *** 0.0761 ** 0.1057 *** 0.0764 **
(0.0255) (0.0378) (0.0253) (0.0376) (0.0253) (0.0375)
Financial intermediation  0.1800 *** 0.2489 *** 0.1617 ** 0.2484 *** 0.1615 ** 0.2491 ***
(0.0672) (0.0356) (0.0668) (0.0353) (0.0668) (0.0352)
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.1019 ** 0.0166 0.0652 0.0121 0.0655 0.0132
(0.0428) (0.0370) (0.0429) (0.0367) (0.0427) (0.0365)
Public administration 0.1875 *** 0.0353 0.1830 *** 0.0353 0.1839 *** 0.0368
(0.0334) (0.0321) (0.0332) (0.0318) (0.0326) (0.0313)
Education 0.0420 -0.0120 -0.0234 -0.0500 * -0.0224 -0.0492 *
(0.0446) (0.0286) (0.0453) (0.0292) (0.0451) (0.0291)
Health and social work  0.0784 * 0.0571 ** 0.0421 0.0576 ** 0.0412 0.0581 **
(0.0436) (0.0269) (0.0438) (0.0267) (0.0437) (0.0266)
Other community and social activities  0.0879 ** 0.0821 ** 0.0745 * 0.0790 ** 0.0748 * 0.0801 **
(0.0408) (0.0391) (0.0407) (0.0388) (0.0403) (0.0387)
Central Croatia -0.0654 *** -0.0596 *** -0.0602 *** -0.0591 *** -0.0601 *** -0.0591 ***
(0.0209) (0.0197) (0.0208) (0.0196) (0.0207) (0.0196)
Adriatic Croatia -0.0229 -0.0642 *** -0.0179 -0.0696 *** -0.0176 -0.0700 ***
(0.0194) (0.0181) (0.0193) (0.0179) (0.0193) (0.0179)
East Croatia -0.0936 *** -0.1115 *** -0.0866 *** -0.1131 *** -0.0860 *** -0.1131 ***
(0.0229) (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0221) (0.0227) (0.0221)
Included observations:  2873 2316 2873 2316 2873 2316
R-squared 0.184 0.238 0.199 0.257 0.199 0.257
Adjusted R-squared 0.177 0.230 0.190 0.247 0.191 0.248
1996
Augmented - experience only Basic equations Augmented equations
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Variable Males Females Males Females Males Females
Constant 2.0425 *** 1.7604 *** 2.4541 *** 2.1249 *** 2.4593 *** 2.1266 ***
(0.0304) (0.0292) (0.0488) (0.0521) (0.0489) (0.0521)
Years of education 0.0624 *** 0.0781 *** 0.0266 *** 0.0520 *** 0.0275 *** 0.0520 ***
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0065)
Elementary school -0.0725 * -0.1019 ** -0.0737 * -0.1007 **
(0.0380) (0.0458) (0.0381) (0.0458)
Secondary school 0.0596 ** 0.0088 0.0539 ** 0.0074
(0.0260) (0.0273) (0.0260) (0.0274)
Non-university college 0.1852 *** 0.1402 *** 0.1803 *** 0.1422 ***
(0.0252) (0.0224) (0.0253) (0.0224)
University 0.1318 *** 0.1041 *** 0.1315 *** 0.1021 ***
(0.0266) (0.0229) (0.0267) (0.0229)
Masters and higher 0.0818 0.0689 0.0816 0.0700
(0.0578) (0.0584) (0.0579) (0.0585)
Tenure 0.0076 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0067 *** 0.0059 ***
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Tenure^2 -0.0002 *** -0.0001 ** -0.0001 *** -0.0002 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Experience 0.0083 *** 0.0039 * 0.0087 *** 0.0037 ** 0.0122 *** 0.0076 ***
(0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Experience^2 -0.0001 *** 0.0001 -0.0002 *** 0.0001 -0.0002 *** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Marital status 0.0813 *** 0.0102 0.0806 *** 0.0094 0.0776 *** 0.0085
(0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0118) (0.0104) (0.0118) (0.0104)
State sector 0.0789 *** 0.0728 *** 0.0773 *** 0.0708 *** 0.0906 *** 0.0768 ***
(0.0128) (0.0142) (0.0126) (0.0139) (0.0123) (0.0137)
Urban settlement 0.0174 * 0.0187 * 0.0167 * 0.0148 0.0156 0.0147
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  -0.0796 *** 0.0332 -0.1123 *** -0.0289 -0.1154 *** -0.0328
(0.0195) (0.0245) (0.0195) (0.0248) (0.0195) (0.0248)
Fishing -0.0308 -0.1345 -0.0232 -0.2212 -0.0382 -0.2107
(0.0692) (0.1694) (0.0682) (0.1663) (0.0683) (0.1664)
Mining and quarrying 0.1190 *** 0.4220 ** 0.1176 *** 0.3397 ** 0.1170 *** 0.3529 **
(0.0452) (0.1696) (0.0445) (0.1667) (0.0446) (0.1668)
Electricity, gas and water supply  0.0992 *** 0.1634 *** 0.1057 *** 0.1697 *** 0.1058 *** 0.1691 ***
(0.0287) (0.0434) (0.0283) (0.0426) (0.0283) (0.0426)
Construction 0.0323 ** 0.0621 * 0.0263 * 0.0741 ** 0.0154 0.0711 **
(0.0153) (0.0366) (0.0151) (0.0359) (0.0150) (0.0359)
Wholesale and retail trade -0.0386 ** -0.0306 ** -0.0344 ** -0.0100 -0.0423 *** -0.0140
(0.0162) (0.0151) (0.0159) (0.0151) (0.0159) (0.0150)
Hotels and restaurants  -0.1057 *** 0.0292 -0.0930 *** 0.0395 ** -0.0984 *** 0.0364 *
(0.0232) (0.0202) (0.0229) (0.0199) (0.0229) (0.0198)
Transport, storage and communication  0.1097 *** 0.2075 *** 0.1130 *** 0.2156 *** 0.1117 *** 0.2149 ***
(0.0174) (0.0273) (0.0171) (0.0268) (0.0171) (0.0268)
Financial intermediation  0.1684 *** 0.3524 *** 0.1479 *** 0.3623 *** 0.1366 *** 0.3626 ***
(0.0454) (0.0271) (0.0449) (0.0266) (0.0449) (0.0266)
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.0152 0.1077 *** -0.0107 0.1014 *** -0.0199 0.0988 ***
(0.0246) (0.0248) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0243) (0.0242)
Public administration 0.1385 *** 0.1142 *** 0.1279 *** 0.1099 *** 0.1235 *** 0.1081 ***
(0.0218) (0.0228) (0.0215) (0.0224) (0.0214) (0.0223)
Education 0.0143 0.0922 *** -0.0456 0.0503 ** -0.0518 * 0.0479 **
(0.0300) (0.0207) (0.0299) (0.0208) (0.0299) (0.0207)
Health and social work  0.1327 *** 0.1879 *** 0.1120 *** 0.1909 *** 0.1114 *** 0.1892 ***
(0.0324) (0.0194) (0.0324) (0.0191) (0.0324) (0.0191)
Other community and social activities  0.0199 0.0406 * -0.0010 0.0409 * -0.0094 0.0381 *
(0.0285) (0.0236) (0.0282) (0.0232) (0.0282) (0.0231)
Central Croatia -0.1222 *** -0.1185 *** -0.1239 *** -0.1161 *** -0.1246 *** -0.1158 ***
(0.0142) (0.0136) (0.0140) (0.0133) (0.0140) (0.0133)
Adriatic Croatia 0.0030 -0.0513 *** -0.0020 -0.0586 *** -0.0029 -0.0589 ***
(0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0127) (0.0116) (0.0127) (0.0116)
East Croatia -0.1264 *** -0.1330 *** -0.1312 *** -0.1313 *** -0.1333 *** -0.1329 ***
(0.0145) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0136)
Included observations:  5834 4263 5834 4263 5834 4263
R-squared 0.325 0.481 0.346 0.502 0.343 0.501
Adjusted R-squared 0.322 0.478 0.342 0.499 0.340 0.498
Augmented - experience only
2004
Basic equations Augmented equations
 
* - significant at 1% level 
** - significant at 5% level 
*** - significant at 10% level 